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From Holt and Mansfield to Story to
Llewellyn and Mentschikoff: The
Progressive Development of Commercial
Law
CHARLES A. BANE*
History . . .is a part of the rational study [of law], because it
is the first step toward an enlightened scepticism, that is, to-
wards a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of those rules.
When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in
the daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just
what is his strength. But to get him out is only the first step.
The next is either to kill him, or tame him and make him a
useful animal.**
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
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I. INTRODUCTION
If each man were physically able to satisfy independently all
of his needs-food, shelter, and the like-perhaps the practice of
trading would never have developed. But because such indepen-
dence is impossible, man early developed the practice of limiting
his efforts to those things he was capable of doing well, and trading
the fruits of those efforts for the things he was incapable of achiev-
ing on his own. Eventually, some men discovered they could earn
their livelihood by trading for profits the goods of others. Inevita-
bly, disputes arose among those traders.
In the United States, commercial disputes are usually settled
by reference to the Uniform Commercial Code. This article traces
the development of the commercial law, which found its ultimate
distillation in the Code. The examination begins in thirteenth cen-
tury England, where merchants governed their conduct by the cus-
toms that developed in their occupation-the law merchant-and
then proceeds to investigate how two great common-law judges
aided in incorporating the law merchant into the common law of
England. The focus then shifts to the newly independent United
States of America, where the law merchant was accepted as part of
the common law. A problem peculiar to the young nation, a politi-
cal system with many independent subdivisions, led to great confu-
sion among merchants transacting business in more than one state.
The answer was obvious, but slow in coming: a codification of
American commercial law, adopted as law by all of the st ates. This
article reviews the efforts of those who sought codification, such as
Justice Joseph Story, and those who eventually achieved it. Qf
those achievers, particular recognition is given to Karl Llewellyn
and Soia Mentschikoff, who together as craftsmen of the law, and
as husband and wife, joined the successful cooperative effort to
tame the dragon of comercial law.
II. THE ENGLISH ORIGINS OF AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LAW: THE
LAW MERCHANT AND THE COMMON LAW
The thread of American commercial law begins in ancient
England, where merchants and traders developed the customs that
formed the law merchant. The principal virtue of the law merchant
was its flexibility; merchants were free to change their customs to
promote more efficient business practices. This same flexibility
prevented the law merchant from being readily integrated into the
more rigid common law. This integration required the efforts of
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two great common-law judges: Lords Holt and Mansfield.
A. The Law Merchant: Of Piepowder Courts, Staple Towns,
and Mercantile Customs
The earliest recorded judicial institution that determined is-
sues of commercial law was the piepowder court, which made its
appearance in England in the middle of the thirteenth century and
existed for more than three centuries thereafter to settle disputes
between merchants. English society in the thirteenth century was
rural and agrarian; what trade there was took place at local fairs.
The piepowder courts were established at these fairs; their name
evolved from an Anglicization of the Norman-French term "pie
poudres," meaning powdered or dirty feet and referring to the
shoes of the itinerant merchants who traded goods at the fairs.'
The authority to hold a piepowder court was part of the royal
franchise to a lord or borough to hold a fair. Court was held before
the lord's stewart of the market, or if it was a borough fair, before
the mayor or bailiff of the borough. The court's jurisdiction was
confined to disputes arising at the fair; this included matters of
debt, contract, trespass, and violations of the Assizes of Bread and
Beer.2 The proceedings were held in a shed and were highly infor-
mal, probably resembling more a street corner argument than a
modern trial. It was justice on the spot, with no delays. In
Colchester in 1458, a merchant-creditor sued in a piepowder court
at eight o'clock in the morning to recover a debt. He won a default
judgment at noon and attached the debtor's goods by four o'clock
that afternoon.'
The piepowder courts applied rules of decision derived from
the customs and usages of the merchants. These rules became
known as the law merchant.4 In accordance with the law merchant,
the piepowder courts enforced informal oral and written agree-
1. For a more detailed description of the piepowder courts, see 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OP ENGLISH LAW 536 (7th ed. 1956). Many merchants came from abroad because
the Magna Carta assured them safe and secure conduct in and out of England. Id. at 540.
2. Id. at 536. An assize was one of the many royal franchises created by technical com-
mon-law language. The grant to hold an Assize of Bread and Beer was the right to hold a
fair with the corresponding power to hold a court of very limited jurisdiction. These courts
established standards for price, weight, and measure of bread and beer-two essential ele-
ments of the medieval diet. Id. at 275.
3. 23 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT I, at 122, 122-25
(1908).
4. See 2 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT PLEAS IN MANORIAL AND OTmR SEIGNORIAL COURTS I,
at 130, 131-32 (1888).
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ments at a time when the common-law courts, bound by the forms
of action, were enforcing only written agreements under seal.
As trade and commerce began to expand beyond the local
fairs, merchants looked for more efficient alternatives to the pie-
powder courts. The result was the Statute of the Staple, promul-
gated in 1353 and described as the most important of all medieval
English commercial statutes.' The Statute established courts in
fifteen staple towns in England, Ireland, and Wales, which became
known as Courts of the Staple.7 The mayor of the staple town,
along with two constables, presided over the court and exercised
jurisdiction over all matters relating to the staple. The Statute re-
quired the mayor to have knowledge of the law merchant and ex-
pressly provided that the staple courts were to apply the law
merchant and not the common law.' The juries that were used
were composed exclusively of merchants. One staple court lawsuit
was based on a claim that wool delivered was not true to the sale
sample; jurisdiction was held to rest in the staple court because
sales by sample were regulated according to the custom of
merchants-the law merchant.9
In the fifteenth century, the bill of exchange came into use for
transactions among merchants. This trading device had come upon
bankers slowly:
"Exchange" was at first the simple process of changing coins of
one currency against those of another, but there soon grew up an
organisation of international bankers having agents or corre-
spondents in the principal commercial centres, and these firms,
instead of actually delivering coins of one type in exchange for
coins of another, would write a letter of exchange to their corre-
spondents, effecting the transfer purely on paper."0
5. Statute of the Staple, 1353, 27 Edw. 3.
6. Beutel, The Development of Negotiable Instruments in Early English Law, 51
HARV. L. REv. 813, 826 (1938).
7. Statute of the Staple, ch. 1. Staple towns were self-governing communities created to
encourage the trading of regularly produced commodities such as lead, tin, leather, wool,
and cloth. Beutel, supra note 6. The Statute also simplified the collection of debts, Statute
of the Staple, ch. 9; created standards of weights and measurements for commercial goods,
id. ch. 10; and provided safe conduct in and out of the realm for all foreign merchants from
friendly countries, id. ch. 2.
8. Statute of the Staple, ch. 8; see J. HOLDEN, THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS IN ENGLISH LAW 14 (1955); Burdick, What is the Law Merchant?, 2 COLUM. L. REv.
470 (1902).
9. Wm. of Dunstable v. Robert le Bal[ancer] (Assize at Romsey 1278), reprinted in 46
SELDEN SoCIETY, SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT II, at 28 (1930) (brackets in
original).
10. T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 666-67 (5th ed. 1956).
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The bill of exchange was originally a continental creature and thus
was not recognized by the xenophobic English common-law courts,
which left its enforcement to the Courts of the Staple under the
law merchant, and with respect to foreign trade, in the admiralty
courts." In 1437 a court resembling a staple court, the Mayor's
Court of London, recognized the right of a bearer of a bill of ex-
change to sue "according to the law merchant."' 2
When Sir Edward Coke became Chief Justice of the King's
Bench in 1613, the common-law courts began to assert a general
jurisdiction over commercial matters-at the expense of the juris-
diction of the piepowder and staple courts.' s A new pleading prac-
tice sprang up in the common-law courts in the 1600's which urged
that prevailing customs among merchants could be the basis for a
legal duty. The pleadings alleged the custom, the facts of the case,
and that the rights and duties of the parties arose by virtue of the
custom."
Two obstacles stood in the way of common-law actions based
on mercantile custom. First, the custom had to exist from time im-
memorial to be recognized as a source of law. This requirement
was easily met because the customs of merchants were found to be
very old. The second requirement was more difficult: the custom
had to be limited in its application-it had to apply to only a par-
ticular class of persons or to a particular place. As Coke put it:
"[A] custome cannot be alledged generally within the kingdome of
England; for that is the common law."' 5 To overcome this obstacle,
the pleadings would allege that the parties were merchants and
that the custom was that of a particular place (usually London).
This new form of action became known as an action on the case
upon the custom of merchants.
Merely pleading that the rights and duties of the parties were
governed by mercantile custom was not enough to secure a judg-
ment. Throughout the seventeenth century the common-law courts
refused to take judicial notice of mercantile customs. The custom
not only had to be pleaded, it had to be proved, and it had to be
11. See id. at 668.
12. Burton v. Davy (Mayor's Ct. of London 1437), reprinted in 49 SELDEN SOCIETY,
SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT III, at 117, 117 (1932).
13. While the piepowder courts were fading in England, the Colony of New York en-
acted a statute in 1692 which gave the colonial governor authority "to have and to hold a
court of Pypowder." An Act for the Settling of Fairs and Markets, ch. 26, 1 N.Y. Colonial
Law 296, 298 (1692).
14. J. HOLDEN, supra note 8, at 31.
15. 2 E. COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LrrTLETON *110b (italics in original).
19831
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
proved de novo in each individual case."6 The courts and the bar
received some assistance from treatises on the law merchant-but
these were written by merchants, not lawyers, and thus were not
regarded as treatises on the law.
17
B. Merging the Law Merchant into the Common Law: Holt
and Mansfield
In the eighteenth century two renowned common-law judges,
Lord John Holt and William Murray, Lord Mansfield, turned their
talents to the law merchant. Their work brought about the solution
to the problems of common-law actions based on mercantile cus-
tom; under these two judges, the law merchant was integrated into
the common law of England.
1. LORD HOLT
The first of these two innovators came to the King's Bench in
1689 and held office until shortly before his death in 1710. Under
Holt the common law courts, when hearing commercial cases, be-
gan to take judicial notice of some of the more notable mercantile
customs. 8 For those cases in which he did not take judicial notice
of a particular mercantile custom, Holt often used the ancient in-
stitution of the special jury,'9 composed of merchants, to advise
him on mercantile customs in England's rapidly developing trade
and commerce activities. Once, he invited all prominent London
merchants to advise him on a question concerning acceptance of a
bill of exchange.' 0
Holt was the first common-law judge to recognize the title to a
bill of exchange in a bona fide transferee for value. In a memorable
case appropriately entitled Anonymous," A lost a bank bill paya-
ble to A or bearer. It was found by a stranger who sold it to the
unsuspecting C. Holt ruled that A could not maintain trover"
16. "[A]lthough we must take notice in general of the law of merchants; yet all their
customs we cannot know but by information." Anonymous, Hardres 485, 486, 145 Eng. Rep.
560, 561 (Ex. 1668).
17. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 10, at 660.
18. Id. at 664.
19. In unusually complex litigation, English courts could draw a jury from a limited list
of persons who held property and positions of a higher degree than those who were allowed
to sit as general jurors. This was known as a special jury. Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A
Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 272 & n.97 (1975).
20. Mutford v. Walcot, 1 Ld. Raym. 574, 575, 91 Eng. Rep. 1283, 1284 (K.B. 1700).
21. 1 Salk. 126, 91 Eng. Rep. 118 (K.B. 1698); see J. HOLDEN, supra note 8, at 64-65.
22. Trover was a common-law form of action originally used to recover damages against
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against C to recover the value of the bill because the course of
trade had established that a bona fide purchaser for value of a bill
payable to bearer takes a property right in the bill.23
Although Holt was innovative in most areas of commercial
law, he was often conservative in some of the relatively new areas
of trade and commerce. For example, Holt refused to accept the
seventeenth-century mercantile custom that recognized promissory
notes as negotiable instruments."" On two occasions Holt faced the
question whether a bona fide transferee for value of a promissory
note took good title; both times he answered in the negative. In
Clerke v. Martin,25 Holt denounced promissory notes as being "in-
novations upon the rules of the common law . . . unknown to the
common law, and invented in Lombard-Street, which attempted in
these matters of bills of exchange to give laws to Westminster-
Hall."2 In Buller v. Crips,1 John Smith endorsed to a third party
a promissory note made payable to "John Smith, or order." The
third party brought an action against the drawer of the note, rely-
ing upon the custom of merchants which recognized the third
party's right to collect on the note. Holt was advised by two
London merchants that they frequently made such notes and
looked upon them as bills of exchange. But Holt concentrated on
the technical differences between a promissory note and a bill of
exchange and refused to recognize the promissory note as negotia-
ble.2 8 This was intolerable for English bankers and merchants. In
1704 they succeeded in having promulgated the Promissory Notes
Act, which made promissory notes "assignable . . . in the same
manner as inland bills of exchange. . . according to the custom of
a person who had found another's goods and converted them to his own use. It ultimately
became the remedy for any wrongful interference with or detention of another's goods.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1351 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
23. 1 Salk. at 126, 91 Eng. Rep. at 118-19.
24. The promissory note, the precursor to the modern checking system, was an inven-
tion of seventeenth-century goldsmiths. They accepted money from their customers on de-
posit, giving in return a note promising to pay the deposit on demand. Merchants regarded
these notes as negotiable. T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 10, at 669.
25. 2 Ld. Raym. 757, 92 Eng. Rep. 6 (K.B. 1702).
26. 2 Ld. Raym. at 758, 92 Eng. Rep. at 6.
27. 6 Mod. 29, 87 Eng. Rep. 793 (K.B. 1703).
28. Holt characterized the promissory note as nothing more than "a piece of paper,
which is in law but evidence of a parol contract." Id. He opined that if a promissory note
were assignable, it would allow anyone but the payee to assign the right to an action against
the drawer of the note. The bill of exchange, on the other hand, had two specific purposes:
expediting trade and hindering the exportation of money from the realm. As long as legal
bills of exchange were available to merchants, Holt insisted, promissory notes were unneces-
sary. 6 Mod. at 29-30, 87 Eng. Rep. 793-94.
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merchants.""9
2. LORD MANSFIELD
The second eighteenth-century judge who contributed to the
development of commercial law needed no parliamentary impetus
to effect reforms. Lord Mansfield was born as William Murray in
1705 into the Scottish peerage and served as Chief Justice of the
King's Bench from 1756 to 1788. His contribution to commercial
law is immeasurable-it prepared English law for the Industrial
Revolution and its reforms.
Mansfield took decisive action to bring the law merchant into
the common law. His primary technique was to use a special jury
of merchants to find the appropriate mercantile custom or usage
and then to use that finding as a rule of law for subsequent cases."
Mansfield was not bothered by technical questions of whether the
custom was long-standing and limited in scope; indeed, he may
have been assisted in his task of incorporating the law merchant
into the common law by Coke's declaration that if a custom was
general within England, it was the common law.3 1
Lord Mansfield used the special jury to create a channel of
communication between the judge and merchant. He treated his
corps with respect and dignity, and he often invited them to dine
with him. Each of them in turn regarded it as an honor to be one
of Lord Mansfield's jurymen. Businessmen found they could obtain
speedy justice before the King's Bench because of Mansfield's effi-
ciency and diligence. Commercial cases flowed into his court, al-
most draining rival courts. Mansfield's zeal sometimes led him to
hold court on holidays, when courts would customarily adjourn. At
one session Mansfield announced his intention of sitting on Good
Friday, which prompted Serjeant Davy, a prominent lawyer, to re-
29. Promissory Notes Act, 1704, 3 & 4 Anne, ch. 9; see Mandeville v. Riddle, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 290, 367 app. (1803); J. HOLDEN, supra note 8, at 79-80.
30. See, e.g., Hankey v. Jones, 2 Cowp. 745, 98 Eng. Rep. 1339 (K.B. 1778); Buller v.
Harrison, 2 Cowp. 565, 98 Eng. Rep. 1243 (K.B. 1777).
31. See supra text accompanying note 15. Fifty-six of Lord Mansfield's Judge's Note
Books were found at Scone Palace in 1967. They contain, among other things, voluminous
trial notes, which are being analyzed and prepared for publication by Professor James C.
Oldham of Georgetown Law School. These notes may illuminate Mansfield's thought
processes beyond those shown in his published opinions.
The notebooks reveal that the two most common causes of action before the Chief Jus-
tice were first for goods sold and delivered, and second for money received. In addition,




mark that "your Lordship will be the first judge to have done so
since Pontius Pilate.""2
Mansfield set forth his views on the necessity of upholding the
negotiability of bills of exchange and promissory notes in Peacock
v. Rhodes:"8
The holder of a bill of exchange, or promissory note, is not to be
considered in the light of an assignee of the payee. An assignee
must take the thing assigned, subject to all the equity to which
the original party was subject. If this rule applied to bills and
promissory notes, it would stop their currency. The law is set-
tled, that a holder, coming fairly by a bill or note, has nothing to
do with the transaction between the original parties . . . . I see
no difference between a note indorsed blank, and one payable to
bearer. They both go by delivery, and possession proves prop-
erty in both cases.
3 4
Mansfield valued certainty in the law merchant, even at the
expense of flexibility. In Edie v. East India Co.," he accepted a
previously settled rule that a bill not endorsed "to order" could
still be negotiable despite evidence that the custom of merchants
on the matter had changed:
Since the trial, I have looked into the cases, and have con-
sidered the thing with a great deal of care and .. .I am very
clearly of opinion, that I ought not to have admitted any evi-
dence of the particular usage of merchants in such a case....
for the law is already settled .
3
Likewise, in Pillans v. Van Mierop,3 7 where Mansfield tried to
abolish the requirement of consideration for a contract, Mansfield
32. E. HEWARD, supra note 31, at 62. The quality of Mansfield's decisions was greatly
enhanced by having many of his cases reported by Sir James Burrow. Burrow's Reports
were a departure in law reporting: he used a modern-type headnote and made sharp divi-
sions between the facts, arguments of counsel, and the opinion of the court. P. WINFIELD,
THE CHIEF SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 190 (1925).
33. 27 Dougl. 633, 99 Eng. Rep. 402 (K.B. 1781).
34. Id. at 636, 99 Eng. Rep. at 403 (footnotes omitted); cf. Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452,
457, 97 Eng. Rep. 398, 401 (K.B. 1758) (Mansfield noted that bank notes are "treated as
money, as cash, in the ordinary course and transaction of business"); Grant v. Vaughan, 3
Burr. 1516, 97 Eng. Rep. 957 (K.B. 1764) (a bill of exchange made payable to A or bearer
was intended to be readily assignable, even without endorsement).
35. 2 Burr. 1216, 97 Eng. Rep. 797 (K.B. 1761).
36. Id. at 1222, 97 Eng. Rep. at 800. Justice Foster in the same case concurred with
Mansfield: "This custom of merchants is the general law of the kingdom, part of the com-
mon law; and therefore ought not to have been left to the jury, after it has been already
settled by judicial determinations." Id. at 1226, 97 Eng. Rep. at 802.
37. 3 Burr. 1663, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B. 1765).
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said: "The law of merchants and the law of the land, is the same: a
witness cannot be admitted, to prove the law of merchants. We
must consider it as a point of law." 8
Consistent with his view of the law merchant as part of the
common law, Mansfield refused to abide by the verdict of a special
jury in Medcalf v. Hall,"' where the defendant-drawer delivered to
the plaintiff-payee a draft on B & Co. at 1:00 p.m. The offices of B
& Co. were only one-half mile away and were open until 5:00 p.m.,
but the payee did not present the draft until the following morn-
ing, by which time B & Co. had failed. Had the payee exercised
due diligence in presenting the draft? Mansfield told the jury that
it had been presented within a reasonable time.40 The jury dis-
agreed and returned a verdict for the drawer. Mansfield ordered a
new trial, but the jury again found for the drawer. Another new
trial was ordered, but at this point the understandably disgruntled
plaintiff gave up.
Despite Mansfield's intractability in Medcalf, he rarely re-
fused to follow the findings of his special jury as to the customs of
merchants and incorporate them into the common law. This prac-
tice has prompted some legal scholars to criticize Mansfield's ap-
proach. One critic complained that the expression lex mercatoria
had "frequently led merchants to suppose, that all their new fash-
ions and devices immediately become the law of the land ....
Merchants ought to take their law from the courts, and not the
courts from merchants .... ."" An American court, in following
banking custom on a checking matter, gave a persuasive answer to
this type of criticism: "[H]istorically the law of negotiable instru-
ments is an outgrowth of the Law Merchant in which law, far more
than accommodating itself to business necessities, was rather the
product of those business practices. No harm lurks in this blending
of law and the needs of modern day commerce. "42
The majority of Mansfield's contemporaries valued his efforts
38. Id. at 1670, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1038.
39. 3 Dougl. 113, 99 Eng. Rep. 566 (K.B. 1782).
40. Id.; cf. Tindal v. Brown, 1 T.R. 167, 99 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1786) (holding that
what is reasonable notice to the endorser of nonpayment by the drawer of a promissory note
is a question of law).
41. Christian, Note to 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *75 (E. Christian 14th ed.
1803) (1st ed. London 1765), quoted in Baker, The Law Merchant and the Common Law
before 1700, 38 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 295, 299 n.19 (1979). Professor Baker believes that Mans-
field's contribution to the law merchant has been exaggerated, and that history has given
insufficient credit to Holt and Mansfield's other judicial predecessors.
42. Duke v. Sun Oil Co., 320 F.2d 853, 861-62 (5th Cir. 1963).
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to modernize commercial law. Within two years of his retirement
as Chief Justice in 1788, three treatises on the law relating to bills
and notes dealt with his decisions. One of these, Stewart Kyd's
treatise on The Law of Bills of Exchange43 was written in 1791 for
both lawyers and "men of business." At least three editions were
published in England and two in the newly established United
States of America. On the other hand, Sir William Blackstone's
treatment of the law merchant in his famous Commentaries is un-
satisfactory, considering that he was living and writing in the
eighteenth century during a time of great developments in com-
mercial law. In late editions of the Commentaries, when Mans-
field's work was nearly done, Blackstone devoted only five pages to
bills of exchange (which he said were commonly known as
draughts) and promissory notes, under the rubric of "debts upon
simple contract." He covered sales in only six pages, under "con-
tract," but devoted several pages to the almost obsolete market
overt.45
It is surprising that Blackstone ignored Mansfield's work, for
the two men were contemporaries who knew and respected each
other. Blackstone had praised Mansfield's work in prize cases, 40
and Mansfield had supported Blackstone for the Vinerian Profes-
sorship at Oxford University where Blackstone delivered the lec-
tures that were to form the basis for his Commentaries.47 Perhaps
Blackstone was simply unaware of the efforts of Mansfield and
Holt to incorporate the law merchant into the common law; Black-
stone regarded the law merchant not as a part of the common law,
but as part of the law of nations and enforced in England as such.
In dealing with "Offenses against the Law of Nations," Blackstone
said that "in mercantile questions, such as bills of exchange and
the like; . .. the law-merchant, which is a branch of the law of
nations, is regularly and constantly adhered to.",48 And again:
[Tihe affairs of commerce are regulated by a law of their own,
called the law merchant or lex mercatoria, which all nations
agree in and take notice of. And in particular it is held to be
part of the law of England, which decides the causes of
43. S. KYri, THE LAW OP BILLS OF EXCHANGE (London 1791). For an interesting and up-
to-date discussion of treatises such as Kyd's, see Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal
Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 632 (1981).
44. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *466-70.
45. Id. at *446-51.
46. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 26.
47. E. HEWARD, supra note 31, at 80.
48. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66 (footnote omitted).
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merchants by the general rules which obtain in all commercial
countries ... 
III. THE LAW MERCHANT IN AMERICA: OF RECEPTION STATUTES
AND JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY
As part of the British Empire, the American colonies had, of
course, been subject to the English common law, and by extension,
the law merchant. After the American Revolution the newly
formed United States did not repudiate the English common law.
Instead of adopting a civil law system as existed in the nations of
continental Europe, the new states chose to retain the common law
and thus preserve the continuity and predictability of their
fledgling judicial systems. Beyond merely retaining the common
law, the American courts, aided by farsighted judges such as
United States Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, molded the
law merchant to fit the particular needs of the newborn United
States of America.
A. Receiving the Common Law
The thirteen new United States moved quickly to adopt the
English common law as the foundation for the law of their respec-
tive states. New York, settled by the Dutch, might have been ex-
pected to be sympathetic to a civil code. But under the urging of
Alexander Hamilton, New York adopted a constitution in 1777
which received the English common law as it existed on April 19,
1775 as the basis of the law of New York.50 Other states, in their
constitutions or by statute, adopted similar provisions that usually
received the common law as it existed on July 4, 1776.'1 States that
followed the original thirteen colonies into the union all (with the
exception of Louisiana) enacted similar reception provisions.8 2
49. 1 id. *273.
50. N.Y. CONST. art. XXXV. April 19, 1775 was the date of the Battle of Lexington.
51. Pennsylvania chose May 15, 1776, the date on which the Continental Congress ad-
vised the colonies to establish their own independent governments. See PA. CONST. sched. 1,
§ 2. The Ordinance of 1787 adopted the.common law for the Northwest Territory. See gen-
erally R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 38-72 (1938).
52. Florida's reception statute, originally enacted when Florida was a territory, has
been carried over into the Revised Statutes. FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1981). See generally J.
SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 469-506 (1965).
For a short time after 1776, English cases decided after the reception dates could not be
cited in several of the new American states. In an Anglophobic mood following the Revolu-
tion, New Jersey and Kentucky, among others, enacted statutes which prohibited any court
of the state from reading or considering any English case decided after July 4, 1776. Id. at
[Vol. 37:351
COMMERCIAL LAW
The law merchant was considered to be a part of the common
law within the meaning of the reception statutes. 3 One state later
admitted to the union, South Dakota, expressly provided that the
common law included the law merchant: "In this state the rules of
the common law, including the rules of the law merchant, are in
force, except where they conflict with the will of the sovereign
1151power ....
The reception statutes were the mechanism for transferring
the common law of England to the new United States,5  but for the
contents of that common law, American lawyers relied heavily on
Blackstone's Commentaries." All editions, and especially the 1783
edition, were widely circulated in the United States. In 1803 an
American edition was published, edited by St. George Tucker of
William and Mary College. 7
America's expanding commercial activities precluded a rote re-
liance on Blackstone's work, for Blackstone gave only cursory
treatment to the law merchant." The United States in the early
493.
53. See Cook v. Remick, 19 Ill. 598 (1858); Stagg v. Linnenfelser, 59 Mo. 336 (1875);
Nash v. Harrington, 1 Aik. 39 (Vt. 1825); cf. Patterson v. Carrell, 60 Ind. 128, 131 (1877)
("The lex mercatoria, the law merchant, is a part of the common law, and governs bills of
exchange, but the lex mercatoria did not, at common law, apply to promissory notes." (cita-
tion omitted)). Some states received as part of the common law the Promissory Notes Act,
1704, 3 & 4 Anne, which ensured the negotiability of promissory notes. See supra text ac-
companying note 29.
54. 1890 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 105 (codified at S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 1-1-24 (1980)).
55. At times, something was lost in the translation from English legalese to American.
Wisconsin wanted to give its cities the right to administer the Assize of Bread, but in some
cases this came out as the "size of bread." L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMEmCAN LAw 460
(1973).
56. Id. at 145.
57. This edition was intended as a textbook. It was used not only by those studying law
on their own (such as Abraham Lincoln), but also by those in law schools; as late as 1826
Professor Stearnes of Harvard Law School made the whole of Tucker's edition required
reading for his students.
58. The first American treatment of the law merchant came in Chancellor James Kent's
Commentaries, published in four volumes between 1826 and 1830. The books were based on
lectures Kent delivered at Columbia University following his retirement from judicial office
in New York. There are obvious similarities between Kent's Commentaries and Blackstone's
Commentaries; indeed, Kent modeled his work on Blackstone's. The topics covered are also
very similar, but Kent's treatment of the law merchant was more extensive. In his discussion
on contracts of sale, Kent devotes 68 pages to the law of sales, covering such matters as
implied warranties, duties of mutual disclosure, and passing of title by delivery. See 2 J.
KENT, COMMENTARIES *468-536. In his treatment of personal property, Kent discusses nego-
tiable paper, dealing with such matters as the essential qualities of negotiable paper, rights
of a holder, acceptance of a bill, endorsements, demand and protest, responsibility of drawer
and endorser, and measure of damages. He cites the few American cases decided, but largely
relies on English cases and treaties, as well as a few continental treatises. See 3 id. at *71-
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part of the nineteenth century had no national currency; private
bank notes were the medium of exchange. Bills of exchange were
widely used as commercial instruments, especially in the East.
Promissory notes were everywhere and people were quite familiar
with the basic rules on endorsements. 9 The courts carefully pre-
served the fundamental virtue of these instruments: their negotia-
bility. But new mercantile customs were springing up in America
that did not fit easily into the English law merchant. American
courts, however, could not emulate Mansfield's technique for incor-
porating a mercantile custom into the common law; American
trade, spread out over several states, was varied and diverse,
whereas Mansfield's commercial class was insulated and homoge-
neous.60 A Justice of the United States Supreme Court believed he
had an answer to this confusion: codification.
B. Justice Joseph Story
A remarkably industrious man, Joseph Story carried on four
professions at the same time: Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, Professor of Law at Harvard University, President of the
Bank of Salem (in Massachusetts), and author of nine legal trea-
tises.6 Two of the treatises, Commentaries on the Law of Bills of
Exchanges2 and Commentaries on the Law of Promissory Notes,"
comprised the first comprehensive study of American negotiable
instruments.
In these two treatises, Story explicitly acknowledged his debt
to his English predecessors. In Bills of Exchange he noted, "I have
availed myself freely of all the English Treatises extant upon the
128.
59. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 236-38.
60. See supra text accompanying note 21. American courts tended to accept American
mercantile customs only as bearing upon the intent of the parties. See, e.g., The Reeside, 20
F. Cas. 458 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (No. 11,657) (Story, J.); Clark v. Baker, 52 Mass. (11 Met.)
186 (1846); Gordon v. Little, 8 Serg. & Rawl. 532 (Pa. 1822); see M. HowTz, THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 188-97 (1977).
61. Story's activities at the bank undoubtedly contributed to his expertise in the law of
negotiable instruments. By the standard of the day, his various occupations did not conflict
with his judicial responsibilities. See G. DUNNE, JUSTICE STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SU-
PREME COURT 141-43, 268-69 (1970).
62. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE (4th ed. Boston 1860)
(1st ed. Boston 1843).
63. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PROMISSORY NOTES (6th ed. Boston 1868)
(lst ed. Boston 1845). In addition to his commentaries on bills of exchange and promissory
notes, Story also published treatises on bailments, bankruptcy, conflict of laws, agency, eq-
uity jurisprudence and pleadings, partnership, and the United States Constitution.
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same subject, and especially of the work of Mr. Baron Bayley...
and that of Mr. Chitty . . ".., In defining a bill of exchange, he
cited Blackstone, Bayley, Kyd, and one American commentator,
James Kent.e6 In Promissory Notes, Story recognized the extent of
English mastery of the field:
[I]n the Courts of Justice in England, for every single suit liti-
gated upon a Bill of Exchange, twenty will probably be found
upon Promissory Notes,-so vast is the circulation, and so ex-
tensive and complicated are the transactions growing out of the
latter, which require almost a daily modification of the law to
adapt it to the new exigencies of business. Hence it is, that
Westminster Hall has, during the last century, become the great
repository of the law on this subject; and the decisions there
made, have acquired a commanding influence and interest
throughout the commercial world."
Justice Story, anticipating many great commercial law schol-
ars, believed commercial law should be codified. In a letter to
Henry Wheaton, the Supreme Court Reporter, he said,
I have long been an advocate of codification of the common law,
at least of that part, which is most reduced to principles & is of
daily & extensive application .... What would be our gain, if
our principles of shipping, insurance, and bills of exchange were
reduced to a code, as they are in a most admirable form in the
French Code of Commerce?
17
In 1836, during a hiatus from his duties as Supreme Court Justice,
Story completed a study commissioned by the Massachusetts Leg-
islature on the feasibility of codifying the state's common law.6
Story was made chairman of an impressive board of commissioners
which drew up an elaborate report, concluding that a general codi-
fication of all the common law in Massachusetts was impractical.
But codifying the commercial law was a different matter:
In regard to commercial contracts . . . the general principles
which define and regulate them, and even the subordinate de-
tails of those principles, to a very great extent, are now capable
of being put in a regular order, and announced in determinate
propositions in the text of a code. Among these contracts, the
64. J. STORY, supra note 62, Preface at viii.
65. Id. at 3-4; see also supra note 58.
66. J. STORY, supra note 63, Preface at ix.
67. Letter from Joseph Story to Henry Wheaton (Oct. 1, 1825), reprinted in G. DUNNE,
supra note 61, at 258.
68. 2 W. STORY, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 241 (Boston 1851).
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Commissioners would especially recommend as the subjects of a
code the following titles, viz.: the law of agency, of bailments, of
guaranty, of suretyship, of bills of exchange, of promissory
notes, of insurance and of partnership. . . [and] bills of lading,
and other contracts of affreightment, including therein the law
of freight . . .9
Not content to simply suggest a codification of American com-
mercial law, Story tried to develop some uniformity in judicial
treatment of commercial matters by creating a federal law
merchant. In Swift v. Tyson,70 a diversity action involving a bill of
exchange, the issue was whether a preexisting debt was valid con-
sideration for the bill. The defendant-acceptor contended that
under the law of New York, where the bill was accepted, it was.
Writing for the Court, Story first determined that New York law
was not binding on the Supreme Court. Relying on, inter alia, Lord
Mansfield's decision in Pillans v. Van Mierop,1 Story held that, as
a matter of federal common law, a preexisting debt could not be
valid consideration for the bill.
In disregarding state law in federal diversity actions, Story
wrestled with section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which pro-
vided, "The laws of the several states, except where the constitu-
tion, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise re-
quire or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at
common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they
apply. ' 73 In a complicated semantic maneuver, Story resolved the
conflict with the Judiciary Act by holding that the word "laws" in
the Act did not extend to state court decisions, which according to
Story "are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are not
of themselves laws."'7 He further stated,
It never has been supposed by us, that [section 34 of the Judici-
69. A Report of the Commissioners appointed to consider and report upon the Practi-
cability and Expediency of reducing to a Written and Systematic Code the Common Law of
Massachusetts, or any part thereof, made to his Excellency the Governor, January, 1837,
reprinted in W. STORY, THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 698, 730-31 (Boston
1852).
70. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Swift was overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78-80 (1938).
71. 3 Burr. 1663, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B. 1765); see supra text accompanying note 37.
72. 41 U.S. at 18-20. Horwitz argues that Story was motivated by a desire to move
commercial disputes solely into the federal courts to remove them from "an uncongenial
anticommercial environment often found in state courts." M. HORWITZ, supra note 60, at 19-
20.
73. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)).
74. 41 U.S. at 18.
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ary Act] did apply, or was designed to apply, to questions of a
more general nature, not at all dependent upon local statutes or
local usages of a fixed and permanent operation, as, for example,
to the construction of ordinary contracts or other written instru-
ments, and especially to questions of general commercial law
:.... [T]his section, upon its true intendment and construction,
is strictly limited to local statutes and local usages. . . and does
not extend to contracts and other instruments of a commercial
nature, the true interpretation and effect whereof are to be
sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the gen-
eral principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence .7
IV. CODIFYING AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LAW
Codification of American commercial law, despite the efforts
of Justice Story, was not to occur for another fifty years. And then
it came not through the rickety federal law merchant developed
under the ill-fated Swift v. Tyson, 7 but by uniform statutes en-
acted by the states.
A. A Short History of American Uniform State Laws: The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and the Uniform Commercial Code
The need for modernization and codification of commercial
law was perhaps greatest in the law of bills of exchange and prom-
issory notes. Bills and notes were the oil for running the American
business machine, but they generated almost endless possibilities
for disputes. Courts were clogged with questions of negotiability
and transfer. In the Century Edition of the American Digest, cov-
ering cases up to 1896, the subject of bills and notes took up virtu-
ally one entire volume of more than 2,700 pages."
Given the confusion in the law of bills and notes, it is not sur-
prising that the first uniform law was the Negotiable Instruments
Law, drafted under the auspices of an organization now known as
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. The conference was organized at the urging of the American
75. Id. at 18-19.
76. Swift was overruled in 1938 by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which
held that Story's decision that state common-law decisions were not binding on federal
courts in diversity actions was unconstitutional, because (1) it denied equal protection under
the law by discriminating against noncitizens of the forum state, id. at 74, and (2) it im-
pinged the independence and authority of the states by invading rights which are "reserved
by the Constitution to the several States." Id. at 80.
77. See 7 CENTURY EDITION OF THE AMERICAN DIGEST 2-2707 (1899).
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Bar Association and held its first meeting in 1892. Commissioners
were in attendance from Delaware, Georgia, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.s One of the first
actions of this initial conference was to recommend uniform state
legislation that would (1) abolish days of grace on all bills and
notes, and (2) provide that all bills and notes falling due on a Sun-
day or legal holiday should be payable and presentable on the next
following secular or business day.79 These were matters of great
concern to bankers and merchants who, it was said, could "never
be certain on what day commercial paper ... is really due if made
payable without the State."80
The commissioners at the 1895 conference authorized their
Committee on Commercial Law to prepare a draft of a uniform
statute on commercial paper,8' based upon an English statute on
the same subject.8 2 The Committee subsequently authorized John
Crawford of New York to prepare the uniform statute, which sub-
stantially resembled the English statute. The final draft of the
statute, eventually known as the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Act, was approved by the' Commissioners at their sixth conference
in 1896.83 Through the efforts of the Commissioners, the Act was
subsequently adopted by all of the states, territories, and insular
possessions of the United States. 4 The Act has been judicially rec-
ognized as a codification of the law merchant;85 section 196 of the
Act stated, "In any case not provided for in this act the rules of
the law merchant shall govern."8 One purpose of this provision
78. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1892-1901 NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Report of Proceedings of the First
Conference of the State Boards of Commissioners for Promoting Uniformity of Law in the
United States (1892), at 5 [hereinafter cited as 1892-1901 NATIONAL CONFERENCE]. The first
chairman of the Conference, Henry R. Beekman of New York, held a somewhat expansive
view of its importance: "It is probably not too much to say that this is the most important
juristic work undertaken in the United States since the adoption of the Federal Constitution
.. Id. at4.
79. Id. at 8.
80. Id. at 7.
81. 1892-1901 NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 78, Fifth Annual Conference of Com-
missioners for the Promotion of Uniformity of Legislation in the United States (1895), at
13.
82. Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., ch. 61.
83. 1892-1901 NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 78, Sixth Annual Conference of Com-
missioners for the Promotion of Uniformity of Legislation in the United States (1896), at
8.
84. Randegger, UCC - Code of Commerce, FALL 1978 UNIFORM LAW MEMO 11, 12.
85. See, e.g., Aikins v. Peterson, 12 Wis. 2d 209, 107 N.W.2d 137 (1961).
86. UNIF. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT § 196 commissioners' note (superseded in those
states enacting U.C.C. § 1-103). This section was later revised to read: "In any case not
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was stated in the Commissioners' Note to the section: "to leave
room for the growth of new usages and customs so that none of
these acts should put the law merchant in a straightjacket and
thus prevent the further expansion of the law merchant." '
In the early 1900's, the Commissioners authorized the prepara-
tion of four more uniform acts. Professor Samuel Williston drafted
all four: Sales (1906), Warehouse Receipts (1906), Bills of Lading
(1909), and Stock Transfers (1909). 8' These acts received wide ac-
ceptance by the states, though none matched the popularity of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act. 9
In 1940, William A. Schnader, President of the Conference,
spoke at the Conference's 50th Annual Meeting.90 He noted that
there had been substantial changes in methods of transacting busi-
ness since the approval of previous uniform acts and that many of
these acts had been adopted piecemeal. Schnader focused on the
duplication and inconsistencies in the provisions governing negoti-
able instruments, bills of lading, warehouse receipts, stock trans-
provided for in this act the rules of [law and equity including] the law merchant shall gov-
ern." Id. § 196 (brackets in original). This was to bring the section into harmony with other
uniform acts. The English statute was phrased slightly differently: "The rules of common
law including the law merchant, save in so far as they are inconsistent with the express
provisions of this Act, shall continue to apply to bills of exchange, promissory notes, and
cheques." Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., ch. 61, § 97(2).
87. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT § 196 commissioners' note.
88. Randegger, supra note 84, at 12.
89. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1940 HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS, Pro-
ceedings of the Fiftieth Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws 396-97 (1940) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK, FIFTTH CONFERENCE].
By 1940 the Warehouse Receipts Act had been adopted in 49 jurisdictions, the Sales Act in
35, the Stock Transfers Act in 28, and the Bills of Lading Act in 29. Id. The bill of lading
had become primarily a railroad document; accordingly, in 1916 Congress had enacted a
Bills of Lading Act to apply to foreign and interstate commerce transactions. Bills of Lading
Act of 1916, ch. 415, 39 Stat. 538.
Among the Commissioners active in the early twentieth century were Woodrow Wilson,
Roscoe Pound, John W. Davis, Louis D. Brandeis, and John W. Wigmore. NAT'L CONFER-
ENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1902-1905 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIS-
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1902), at 30-31; NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'R ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS, 1906-1908 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS (1906), at 15-16; NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'R8 ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1910-1912
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1910), at 15-17; NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1922-1924 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1924), at 8-11. The draftsman of the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act, approved by the Commissioners in 1933, was Karl Llewellyn, a longtime
Commissioner from New York. Randegger, supra note 84, at 14-16. A later Commissioner
from Illinois was Soia Mentschikoff, who served from 1965 to 1970. WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA
2285 (41st ed. 1980-1981).
90. HANDBOOK, FIFTIETH CONFERENCE, supra note 89, at 35.
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fers, sales, and trust receipts. He recommended against attempts to
revise and update the individual acts, which would have required
371 separate legislative battles. Instead, he advocated the prepara-
tion of "a great uniform commercial code . . . which would bring
the commercial law up to date, and which could become the uni-
form law of our fifty-three jurisdictions, by the passage of only
fifty-three acts . ,,, This was the genesis of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.
On the day following Schnader's address, Karl N. Llewellyn,
Chairman of the Uniform Commercial Acts Section of the Confer-
ence, presented his Section's report to the Conference. Llewellyn, a
professor of law at Columbia University, had been drafting as Re-
porter (expert draftsman) a revised Uniform Sales Act. He re-
ported that the revised sales act was being drafted so that it could
be a separate uniform act or a chapter in a possible uniform com-
mercial code." Before the Conference's 1940 meeting concluded,
the Executive Committee had approved "the preparation of a
Commercial Code. . . as soon as funds are available in an amount
deemed by the Executive Committee to be adequate." '
There was some urgency about the project. The Merchants As-
sociation of New York City was pressing for federal commercial
legislation following the 1938 United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, which overruled Swift v. Ty-
son. 4 The New York merchants were not alone in regarding Erie
as foreclosing any possibility of achieving a uniform commercial
law through the federal courts." But the disruption of World War
II and an initial difficulty in raising funds slowed progress on the
commercial code. Nevertheless, the revised Uniform Sales Act was
completed in 1944. That same year, the Maurice and Laura Falk
Foundation made the first of its generous grants, eventually total-
ling $250,000, for the commercial code project."
Work on the Code began in earnest in 1945 as a cooperative
effort of the Conference and the American Law Institute (ALI).
91. Id. at 58. Schnader further stated that the drafting of such a code would be akin to
the American Law Institute's restatements of decisional law. These two organizations would
one day join in a cooperative effort to draft and have enacted the Uniform Commercial
Code. See infra text accompanying note 97.
92. HANDBOOK, FivrirH CONFERENCE, supra note 89, at 90.
93. Id. at 114.
94. See supra note 76.
95. See Randegger, supra note 84, at 13.
96. Id. at 14.
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They were committed to completing it within five years." Karl
Llewellyn served as Chief Reporter for the entire project, with Soia
Mentschikoff as Associate Chief Reporter." Drafting proceeded at
full speed with an editorial board reviewing progress throughout
the year. At least once a year the entire conference and the ALI
reviewed the drafts. Preliminary copies of Code sections were also
submitted for comment to a special Uniform Commercial Code
Committee of the American Bar Association Corporate Law Sec-
tion. Walter Malcolm, a Boston lawyer and chairman of that ABA
committee, made a singular contribution to the Code when he re-
drafted its bank collections provisions to overcome objections from
the Federal Reserve Banks and other critics, and then negotiated
successfully to win their approval of the revised sections." The Re-
porters sought advice from state and local bar associations and
consulted with lay advisors from various associations or groups of
merchants, businessmen, bankers, warehouse operators, and farm-
ers. 100 These efforts culminated in 1951, when the Conference, the
ALI, and the American Bar Association House of Delegates ap-
proved the completed Code.101
The Conference and the ALI debated whether the Code
should be presented to Congress for enactment; indeed, the Code
was drafted so that it could have been suited for national legisla-
tion with only a few changes. But the sponsoring organizations
concluded that congressional enactment would be only a partial
remedy; it was doubtful that federal authority over interstate com-
merce would reach the multitudinous commercial transactions cov-
ered by the Code. Further, the Commissioners, dedicated to uni-
form state laws, were biased in favor of state enactment. 10 2 The
sponsors then considered an attempt to achieve uniform state en-
actment through an interstate compact, but concluded that there
were no advantages to this method over legislative enactments by
the individual states.103
97. Schnader, The New Commercial Code: Modernizing Our Uniform Commercial
Acts, 36 A.B.A. J. 179, 180 (1950).
98. Randegger, supra note 84, at 15. Llewellyn and Mentschikoff were married in 1946.
99. Id.
100. See Mentschikoff, The Uniform Commercial Code-An Experiment in Democ-
racy in Drafting, 36 A.B.A. J. 419 (1950). Note the echoes of Lord Mansfield's special juries
composed of merchants.
101. A.B.A. SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINEss LAW, UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE HANDBOOK 5 (1964).
102. Dunham, A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, 30 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 233, 238, 241 (1965).
103. Id. at 243. The Conference saw little advantage in the compact method, because it
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The leadership of the Conference pressed on for individual
state enactment, concentrating first on the larger, more commer-
cially active states, but with the ultimate goal of enactment by all
states-thus bringing under the Code all commercial transactions
within the nation. The Code was introduced in 1953 in the legisla-
tures of several states, including California, Mississippi, and New
York, ostensibly for educational purposes. 104 Under the prodding
of William Schnader, Pennsylvania enacted the Code in 1953 with-
out a single dissenting vote.105
Objections developed. Some consumer advocates characterized
the Code as a "lawyers and bankers relief act" and objected to the
absence of consumer credit protections. 0° Certain New York bank-
ers strongly objected to the Code, and when it was introduced in
New York in 1953, the legislators sent it to the New York Law
Revision Committee for comment and analysis. The Commission
spent three years in hearings; the Code's editorial board followed
every hearing, and drafted amendments to meet objections and ex-
plained why others were unnecessary.10 7 The result was the Uni-
form Commercial Code-1957 Official Edition. Herbert F. Good-
rich, Chairman of the Code's editorial board and Director of the
American Law Institute, wrote in a foreword to that edition:
Further re-examination of work which covers as wide a field
as this could, of course, go on indefinitely. There comes a time
when one must say that the advantage of what little will result
from further examination is greatly outweighed by the desirabil-
ity of bringing to a conclusion what has been a long and careful
piece of work.108
The Conference made available to legislatures a team of ex-
perts (Llewellyn, Mentschikoff, and University of Wisconsin law
professor Charles Bunn, who helped edit the final version of the
believed most state legislatures involved in such a compact would impose restrictions on
how long they were obligated to have identical laws. Also, they saw "constitutional difficulty
in the attempts of legislatures to bind their successors as to the content of legislation for
any period of time." Id. Furthermore, the United States Constitution requires congressional
approval of interstate compacts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
104. Randegger, supra note 84, at 16.
105. Uniform Commercial Code, Pub. L. No. 1, 1953 Pa. Laws 3; see Randegger, supra
note 84, at 16.
106. Randegger, supra note 84, at 16. This was a deliberate omission, approved after
careful consideration. Dunham, supra note 102, at 248. The Conference has since drafted
and approved a separate Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U3C).
107. Randegger, supra note 84, at 16.
108. Goodrich, Foreword to ALI & NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE at v (1957 official ed.).
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Code) to answer questions about the Code. Largely through their
efforts, and the efforts of the Commissioners, Massachusetts
adopted the Code in 1957; Kentucky in 1958; Connecticut and New
Hampshire in 1959; seven states, including the large commercial
states of Ohio, Illinois, and New Jersey in 1961; New York in 1962;
and so on until all states were in line by 1967, with Louisiana as
the lone holdout.109
B. A Brief Survey of the Uniform Commercial Code
The Uniform Commercial Code is, according to Soia Ment-
schikoff, "a 'private' law codification centering around the move-
ment of goods by way of sale and the incidental services of rail-
roads, warehousemen, bankers, finance companies, and the like in
connection with that movement."' 10 In some articles, the Code pre-
serves much of what had gone on before; in others, the provisions
were new and imaginative, designed to solve through black letter
principles problems that had defied judicial resolution.
In the first category, preserving the traditional, are Articles 2
(Sales), 3 (Commercial Paper), 6 (Bulk Transfers), and 7 (Ware-
house Receipts, Bills of Lading and Other Documents of Title).
But even these traditional areas are refined where necessary or de-1
sirable. For example, the Sales Article makes a distinction for the '
109. Table 1 in ALI & NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE at xxxv (1972 official ed.). Upon enactment, the preceding uniform
commercial laws were repealed. For example, in Illinois the Code repealed the following acts
or parts of acts:
i. Negotiable Instruments Law
ii. Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act
iii. Uniform Sales Act
iv. Bulk Sales Act (Chattels in Bulk)
v. Uniform Stock Transfer Act
vi. An Act concerning contracts for the conditional sale or lease of railroad, street
car and motor vehicle equipment and rolling stock and providing for the
recording thereof.
vii. Uniform Trust Receipts Act
viii. An Act to regulate the foreclosure of chattel mortgages on household goods,
wearing apparel and mechanic's tools.
ix. Factors Lien Act
x. An Act relating to the assignment of accounts receivable.
xi. An Act to regulate assignment of notes secured by chattel mortgages and to
regulate the sale of property under a power of sale contained in chattel
mortgages.
xii. Uniform Bills of Lading Act
Uniform Commercial Code § 10-102, 1962 Ill. Laws 2101.
110. S. MENTSCHIKOFF, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 3-4 (1970).
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first time between the legal effects of the acts of a "merchant" (as
defined) and the acts of a consumer or other person not knowl-
edgeable in the field."' And the Article on Commercial Paper, su-
perseding the Negotiable Instruments Act, abandons the term "bill
of exchange" and substitutes "draft."1 12 Although a "note" is de-
fined, the Article does not preserve the traditional dichotomy of
provisions for bills and notes.
Several articles have no prior uniform acts; the Code here cre-
ates provisions accommodating the best of prior case law and the
legitimate practices of those who will have to carry on their com-
mercial activities under the Code. This is the case with Article 4
(Bank Deposits and Collections) and Article 5 (Letters of Credit).
Article 8 (Investment Securities) contains some provisions from
the preceding Negotiable Instruments Act and the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act, but gaps are filled to accommodate modern
practices." 3
Article 9 (Secured Transactions; Sales of Accounts and Chattel
Paper) is considered by many to be the signal achievement of the
Code. Taking the confused state of prior law relating to chattel
mortgages and conditional sales, the Reporters reduced to black
letter principles a Code which permitted easy and effective finan-
cing secured by accounts receivable and chattels, including inven-
tories."' These types of financing had been difficult to implement
before the adoption of the Code, because by their very nature, in-
ventories and accounts receivable had to be retained by the bor-
rower and disposed of in the usual course of trade or business. The
law, moreover, had looked with complete disfavor on any security
arrangement in which the borrower retained the power to dispose
of mortgaged assets. In Benedict v. Ratner,"' the United States
Supreme Court held that under the laws of New York, a lender's
lien on accounts receivable that permitted the borrower to retain
complete control of the accounts was void as an attempt to defraud
111. U.C.C. § 2-104 (1), (3).
112. Id. § 3-104(2)(a). The term "draft" was commonly used for bills of exchange in
Blackstone's time. See supra text accompanying note 44.
113. Article 8 of the Code requires that a security be represented by an "instrument."
U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(a)(i). In 1977 revisions of Article 8 were recommended that would permit
dispensing with stock certificates, reflecting developments in computers and telecommunica-
tions. See U.C.C. §§ 8-101, -102 (Reasons for 1977 Change).
114. For an excellent description of the state of this prior law, see U.C.C. § 9-101
comment.
115. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
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the borrower's creditors. 16
England overcame these problems by statutorily authorizing a
"floating lien. 1 17 The use of floating liens in this country had been
hampered because trust receipts and field warehousing, the only
two methods that could be adapted to such a lien, dealt only with
goods in existence at the time of the financing arrangement and
could not extend to after-acquired property." 8 A device for secur-
ing interests in inventory and in accounts receivable resulting from
sales of the inventory, with the borrower in complete control of the
terms of the financing, was sorely needed." 9 Section 9-205 of the
Code established this kind of security: "A security interest is not
invalid or fraudulent against creditors by reason of liberty in the
debtor to use, commingle or dispose of all or part of the collateral
.... ,"110 This provision was coupled with an express provision in
section 9-204 that the security interest could include after-ac-
quired goods and extend to future advances to the borrower as well
as to his present obligations. With these two provisions, the au-
thority for effective inventory and accounts receivable financing
was complete.' 2 '
The Code was drafted to accommodate changes in customs or
usages of trade. Article 1, "General Definitions and Principles of
Interpretation," provides that "[a] course of dealing between par-
ties and any usage of trade ...give particular meaning to and
supplement or qualify terms of an agreement."' 22 Section 1-102 of
the Code states that one of the underlying purposes and policies of
116. Id. at 360. After Ratner, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit applied the same doctrine to a chattel mortgage on inventory when the borrower re-
tained the power of disposition. Brown v. Leo, 12 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1926). But not all courts
were persuaded by Ratner; the Fifth Circuit in Second Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 189 F.2d 115,
117 (5th Cir. 1951) said, "Fortunately in this circuit the Ratner case has never been a
fetish."
117. Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 23.
118. After-acquired property is collateral which the debtor does not own at the time of
the financing arrangement, but which may be acquired at some future date. See U.C.C. § 9-
204.
119. For a description of the problems of pre-Code chattel financing, and a discussion
of the solutions afforded by the Code, see Bane, Chattel Security Comes of Age: Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 DE PAUL L. REv. 91 (1951).
120. U.C.C. § 9-205.
121. There are some arguments against easy financing with inventory and accounts re-
ceivable. Commentators fear that lenders might demand a lien on the borrower's inventory
and accounts receivable, no matter what the size of the loan, and that, as a result, no assets
of the borrower would be free of the lien and available to unsecured creditors. See Gilmore,
The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 27, 36,
43-44 (1951). In the opinion of the author, these fears have not been realized.
122. U.C.C. § 1-205(3).
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the Code is "to permit the continued expansion of commercial
practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties." 123
This open-minded attitude reflected the drafting philosophy of
Karl Llewellyn. As Professor Grant Gilmore noted,
[Llewellyn's] instinct appeared to be to draft in a loose, open-
ended style; his preferred solutions turned on questions of fact
(reasonableness, good faith, usage of trade) rather than on rules
of law. He had clearly in mind the idea of a case-law Code: one
that would furnish guide-lines for a fresh start, would accommo-
date itself to changing circumstances, would not so much con-
tain the law as free it for a new growth.1 '
The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code was established in 1961 to maintain a constant review of the
Code. The Permanent Board was to revise the Code to accommo-
date new needs or to reflect changes learned from the actual opera-
tion of the Code, and to review nonuniform amendments added by
some of the states to determine if they should be added as part of
the uniform provisions of the Code. William A. Schnader was
Chairman of the Permanent Editorial Board, Karl Llewellyn a
member, and Soia Mentschikoff a consultant to the Board. The
first report of the Board in 1962 resulted in minor changes to
twenty-five code sections, which were incorporated into the 1962
official edition of the Code.'
Article 9 is regarded as particularly watchworthy, in view of
the originality of its provisions, the nonuniform amendments
added in some jurisdictions, and the wealth of comment on it from
various lawyers and legal scholars. Accordingly, an Article 9 Re-
view Committee was established in 1966 under the Permanent Edi-
torial Board. The Reporter was Robert Braucher, later Associate
Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; Homer
Kripke was named Associate Reporter and Soia Mentschikoff as
Associate Reporter Ex Officio.' 26 The Final Report of the Article 9
123. Id. § 1-102(2)(b).
124. Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814 (1962).
125. Randegger, supra note 84, at 19.
126. See Report No. 3 of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code (Dec. 15, 1966), reprinted in ALI & NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE at xxvii, xxix (1972 official text).
Karl Llewellyn died in 1962. "Despite the numbers of persons involved in the drafting
of the Code, the extent to which it reflects Llewellyn's philosophy of law and his sense of
commercial wisdom and need is startling." S. MENTSCHIKOFF, supra note 110, at 4 n.3.
For a series of reminiscences (or "reflections") by some of the original drafters of vari-
ous articles of the UCC, see 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 535-84 (1982). Various problems that arose in
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Review Committee was published and approved by the Permanent
Editorial Board in 1971. The Report, commenting on the operative
effect of Article 9, said: "[T]he outstanding result of Article 9 in
practice has been that it has been gratifyingly successful; that no
errors with serious consequences have been disclosed; and that the





From the days when dusty-footed traders settled their dis-
putes before the bailiffs of the staple courts, merchants have
sought an integrated, sensible, and efficient body of commercial
law for the use and regulation of commercial transactions. In
America the problems of merchants striving to conduct business in
a net of conflicting state laws increased each time a new state
joined the union. In bringing order out of the commercial chaos,
the sophisticated legal theoreticians and pragmatic businessmen
who drafted the Uniform Commercial Code did more than follow
in the footsteps of Holt, Mansfield, and Story to spin the wheels of
industry. With the enactment of the Code, Holmes's prophecy of
the uses of history has been fulfilled: the dragon of commercial law
has been tamed and made a useful animal.
the drafting stages are discussed by Soia Mentschikoff, id. at 537, Fairfax Leary, id. at 557,
and Homer Kripke, id. at 577. Other contributors are Peter Coogan, id. at 545, and Allison
Dunham, id. at 569. Several of the contributors discuss problems, arising since the enact-
ment of the original Code, which are being considered by the 348 Committee of the Perma-
nent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code. Expected contributions from Rob-
ert Braucher and Grant Gilmore were frustrated by their untimely deaths.
127. ALl & NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 869 app. (General Comment on the Approach of the Review Committee on
Article 9) (1978 official text). A large majority of states have adopted the Review Commit-
tee's proposed revisions of Article 9.
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